Key quote : "This Court held that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing a "bridge" permit for the construction of the causeway. The Court revoked the permit and enjoined the issuance of a further permit under the General Bridge Act."
Therefore the creation of the solid cause was done knowingly illegally: The US Coast Guard's false testimony deceived Congress (which was told it was to be a causeway with large culverts..
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 639 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Me. 1986)
No. 84-0388 B (Sierra II). (excerpt)
Full decision:
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/639/1216/1746489/
In No. 84-0388 B (Sierra II), plaintiff charged that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing a "bridge" permit under the General Bridge Act of 1946, 33 U.S.C. § 525(b), for the construction of the causeway portion of the Project (Count I), and violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS before issuing the permit (Count II).
Named as defendants were the Secretary of Transportation and the Commandant of the Coast Guard (collectively "the federal defendants"), and MeDOT.
Following review of the administrative record, this Court held that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing a "bridge" permit for the construction of the causeway. The Court revoked the permit and enjoined the issuance of a further permit under the General Bridge Act. The Court did not address the NEPA issues also raised by plaintiff.
The federal defendants did not appeal this Court's ruling, but MeDOT did. On December 23, 1985, the Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation of the "bridge" permit by this Court. Sierra Club v. Secretary of Transportation, 779 F.2d 776 (1st Cir.1985) (Sierra Club II).
End excerpt
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1985 Sierra Club v. Secretary of Transportation. 779 F.2d 776 (1st Cir)
"Maine DOT appealed a ruling by the US District Court for Maine in favor of the Sierra Club, holding that the Coast Guard had arbitrarily and capriciously issued a permit for the construction of a "bridge" between Kidder Point, Maine, and Sears Island, Maine.
The Court of Appeals here upholds the permit revocation, writing:
"The arbitrary and capricious action of the Coast Guard in allowing Maine DOT to submit an application for a causeway as if it were an application for a bridge and approving such application by itself treating the structure as a bridge is sufficient to justify the revocation of the permit."
End excerpt
1987 Sierra Club v. Secretary of Army 820 F.2d 513 Circuit Court of appeals rejects appeal by government of attorneys fees awarded to Sierra Club from Sears Island causeway case.
1989 Sierra Club v. Marsh 872 F.2d 497 "The Sierra Club asked the district court to enjoin both the federal and state agencies from continuing to build the causeway or otherwise work upon the Sears Island project while the court considered the merits of its various, rather complex objections...The federal district court denied the Sierra Club's request for a preliminary injunction.
The determination of the district court not to issue the preliminary injunction is vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings...
In sum, given the likely secondary effects of the Sears Island project and the other effects previously described, the record in this case cannot support a FONSI, and therefore an EIS must be prepared.
We reach this conclusion not because preparation of an EIS is merely a technical requirement which, under NEPA and its implementing regulations, we must here enforce. Rather, this requirement reflects NEPA's underlying purpose in requiring agencies to determine and assess environmental effects in a systematic way--namely, having decisionmakers focus on these effects when they make major decisions. That is to say, the requirement flows not only from the letter, but also from the spirit, of NEPA.
The decision of the district court is vacated and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
