(120 page pdf)
A comprehensive summary based on data compiled by Ron Huber, Penobscot BayWatch with fieldwork and analysis by Paul Bernacki, Jillian Howell and Ruby Treyball, aka "The Home Team"
Purpose: Synthesize historical documentation, citizen advocacy efforts, and a 2025 professional assessment of the extent of GAC Chemical Corporation's pollution of Stockton Harbor accompanied by the illegally built Sears Island causeway
Prepared by Paul Bernack. Funded by Ron Huber
EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
This Report documents eight decades of industrial chemical manufacturing at Kidder Point, Searsport, Maine, and synthesizes its cumulative environmental impact on Stockton Harbor—a critical pocket estuary within the Penobscot River/Bay interface.
Since the late 19th century, The site has operated continuously . It was a steamboat landing, beginning in the 1920s importation, then preparation of superphosphate fertilizers, followed by alum, sulfuric acid, ammonia, alum (45,000 tons/year capacity) and numerous other chemicals to order.
Key Finding: Industrial operations have created multiple contamination pathways into Stockton Harbor through:
- Direct wastewater discharge pipelines
- Atmospheric deposition (acid fog/mist)
- Eroding shoreline fill containing industrial waste
- Buried building materials (asbestos, lead, PCBs, tarpaper)
- Bauxite tailings dumped on shore
Despite 26+ years of citizen documentation and advocacy, regulatory agencies have failed to comprehensively address ongoing pollution that threatens the brackish/saltwater interface critical to estuarine function.
I. SITE HISTORY & CORPORATE SUCCESSION (1925-2024)
Timeline of Ownership and Operations
1925-1944: Summers Fertilizer Company
- 1925: Began import operations at Searsport with small storage facilities
- 1929: Bulk storage plant operational
- 1944: Built sulfuric acid and superphosphate plant (T.W. Cunningham, contractor)
- 1946: Purchased crane-operated facility at Sandy Point in Stockton Springs (second site impacting the estuary)
- 1950: Completed "European process sulfate of ammonia plant"—first of its type in United States
- French Kuhlmann Corporation technology
- Belgian engineer from Zelsate assisted
- Fred L. Litty, top chemical engineer, was general manager
- Graver Construction Company (NYC/Chicago) built it
- Featured world's first industrial-scale laminated wood arch Quonset hut (4-foot thick arched plywood beams)
1943-1966: Northern Chemical Industries (NCI)
- Division of Summers Fertilizer, then independent
- 1953: Added aluminum sulfate process
- 1955: Built ammonia plant (joint venture with Chemetron Corp.)
- 125 tons/day design capacity
- 45,000 tons/year production capacity
- Oil-fired Texaco process
- Built by Girdler
- 1956: Added ammonia nitrate plant and nitric acid plant
- 1965: Operations documented in Grace Brothers Superfund case submission
- Described "worn and aged" buildings
- Equipment condition "bad to good"
- "Quite dirty" facilities
- Critical admission: "All salt water used is on a once-through basis, and returns to the bay in surface ditches"
- 1966: W.R. Grace & Company leased facility
- Ammonia production discontinued
- Planned to import ammonia from Trinidad via Grace ships
1970-1994: Delta Chemical Inc.
- 1970: W.R. Grace discontinued superphosphates, ammonium nitrate, nitric acid production
- Delta Chemical succeeded Grace
- 1974: Fernview Collision Incident—Major environmental evidence
- Ship collided with BAR pier in acid fog on August 21, 1974
- Delta's sulfuric acid plant 1.3 miles from pier
- 98% acid recorder malfunction caused excessive SO3 emissions
- SO3 + water = sulfuric acid mist/fog
- Reduced visibility, caused respiratory distress in longshoremen
- Court found Delta 35% liable
- Corporate culture revealed in Delta log book doggerel (Nov. 15, 1974):
"Gas leaks gas leaks everywhere / Promises to fix them float in the air / Time continues to pass us by / While the fumes still head for the sky / There is nothing there to West's eye / Production Production is Sawyer's cry / As you sit gasping in your chair / The 'Dollar Sign' is everywhere. / In the background OHSA [sic] lurks / Waiting to foul up the works."
- 1970s: Began dumping bauxite tailings on shore
- 1993: Manufacturing liquid alum, ammonium sulfate, sodium aluminate, polyacrylamide polymers
- Receiving and reselling sulfuric acid in bulk
1994-Present: General Alum & Chemical / GAC Chemical Corporation
- March 1994: General Alum & Chemical Corporation (founded 1979 by James A. Poure) purchased Delta's 152-acre facility
- November 1999: Renamed GAC Chemical Corporation
- May 2003: Toledo, Indianapolis, and Saukville plants sold; headquarters moved to Searsport
- June 23, 2015: Converted to Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)
- Current operations: Manufactures/distributes liquid alum, ammonium sulfate, sodium aluminate, aqua ammonia, liquid urea, polyvinyl alcohol, hollow sphere plastic pigments
Scale of Historical Operations
Ammonia Production (1955-1967):
- 12 years of operation at 45,000 tons/year capacity
- Approximately 540,000 tons total ammonia production
- Required millions of gallons/day of seawater cooling
- All cooling water returned to Stockton Harbor via surface ditches
Waste Generation Estimates:
- Conservative (5% waste): 2,250 tons/year → 27,000 tons over 12 years
- High estimate (15% waste): 6,750 tons/year → 81,000 tons over 12 years
Associated Chemical Production: Each with separate waste streams feeding into harbor:
- Superphosphate fertilizer
- Sulfuric acid (two plants: 60 T/D + 100 T/D capacity)
- Ammonium sulfate
- Alum (17,000 sq ft building)
- Nitric acid
- Ammonium nitrate
- Various solutions
II. AERIAL PHOTO ANALYSIS: VISUAL EVIDENCE OF EXPANDING CONTAMINATION (1939-1990)
The aerial photo analysis tracking changes at the facility reveals progressive environmental degradation:
Key Observations by Time Period
1939-1965: Infrastructure Development
- 1939: Vegetated site, minimal facilities
- 1957: Ammonia plant present with carbon settling ponds, original lagoon south of alum plant
- 1963: Plant expanded, multiple carbon settling ponds visible, dark sediments visible
- 1965: Single lagoon SW of plant, "no discharges visible"
1966-1990: Bauxite Mud Accumulation Era
- 1966: Second lagoon visible, bauxite mud visible in end of carbon pond 2
- 1972: Bauxite mud discharges visible in all six carbon ponds
- 1974: Area of bauxite mud deposits increasing
- 1982: Area of bauxite mud deposits increasing (repeated observation)
- 1985: Area of bauxite mud deposits increasing
- 1990: Area of bauxite mud deposits increasing
Pattern: Consistent, progressive expansion of bauxite mud contamination from 1966-1990, correlating with alum production from bauxite ore using acid leaching process.
III. CONTAMINATION PATHWAYS INTO STOCKTON HARBOR
1. Direct Water Discharge (1944-1970s, potentially ongoing)
1965 Grace Brothers Document Evidence:
- "All salt water used is on a once-through basis, and returns to the bay in surface ditches"
- Salt water temperature: 30°F to 64°F (winter to summer)
- Used for cooling: power plant, ammonia plant, nitric acid plant, ammonium nitrate plant
- Three water systems: city water, closed circuit cooling, and salt water from bay
Discharge composition likely included:
- Heated cooling water
- Chromate inhibitors (from closed circuit system)
- Process contamination from leaks/spills
- Acidic runoff from manufacturing areas
- Heavy metals from chemical processes
2. Atmospheric Deposition: The 1974 Acid Fog Incident
August 21, 1974 - Fernview Collision Case Evidence:
The Malfunction:
- Delta Chemical's 98% sulfuric acid recorder failed
- Plant continued operating despite knowing this was dangerous
- June 1974 memo (2 months prior) warned: "This instrument is necessary to make acid and hold the strength without fluctuation. Any sudden change in strength results in heavy absorber stack omissions [sic] that are visible to the surrounding area."
The Environmental Impact:
- Excessive SO3 emissions from stack
- SO3 + atmospheric moisture = sulfuric acid mist
- Created "fuming acid" at 100.4% concentration
- Acid fog reduced visibility to near zero
- Traveled 1.3 miles to BAR pier
- Caused respiratory distress in longshoremen (eye/lung irritation)
- Court found Delta 35% liable for ship collision
Implications:
- Proves atmospheric acid deposition into Stockton Harbor
- Pattern of prioritizing production over safety
- Regulatory evasion culture
- If visible acid fog reached 1.3 miles, chronic low-level deposition likely occurred throughout operations
3. Shoreline Erosion of Industrial Fill (1970s-Present)
1970s Delta Chemical Actions:
- Began dumping highly acidic bauxite tailings onto shore
- Created filled shoreline containing industrial waste
- No proper containment or capping
1998 Maine DMR Study Findings:
- Approximately 1 acre of contaminated intertidal flats
- Sediment: off-white creamy color, discolored patches up to 1 meter square
- Depth: few millimeters to 10 centimeters
- Below: typical anoxic (black) sediment
- Source: "historical spills and slumping banks and chemical piles"
- Eroding embankment of filled land containing "creamy/light rose colored bauxite"
- Beach and flats contain same material
Ecological Impact (1998):
- Abundance of benthic invertebrates "far lower" near facility
- Compared to control area across Stockton Harbor
- Clear link between eroding wastes and low species abundance
4. Buried Building Materials (Late 1990s-Present)
The Quonset Hut Collapse:
- World's first industrial-scale laminated wood arch Quonset hut
- Built 1940s-1950s with 4-foot thick laminated arches
- Late 1990s: Ron Huber photographed derelict building
- Arches still structurally sound
- Tarpaper roof collapsing
- Materials sinking into intertidal flats
2015 Findings (Friends of Penobscot Bay Report):
- "Large quantities" of tarpaper roofing materials in intertidal mud
- Depth: 6-12 inches below mud surface
- Prevents softshell clams and invertebrates from reaching preferred depths
- Unknown extent throughout cove
5. Pipeline Infrastructure
1998 Sampling Expedition (Ron Huber, Paul Schroeder):
- Offshore platform marks "discontinued intake for industrial chemicals"
- Pipeline from platform to shore
- Used for importing bulk chemicals (likely ammonia from Trinidad per 1965 plan)
- Potential contamination from:
- Pipeline leaks/ruptures
- Loading/unloading spills
- Residual chemicals in abandoned infrastructure
IV. REGULATORY COMPLIANCE HISTORY & FAILURES
Documented Violations (1983-2025)
Spills:
- 77 spills documented between 1983 and 2020 (Maine DEP database)
- 20 spills since GAC took ownership (1994-2020)
- Average: more than 2 spills per year for 37 years
Water Quality Violations:
- pH violations identified in 4 of last 12 fiscal quarters (per ECHO database)
- Chronic, ongoing problem
Legal Actions:
-
2002: Conservation Law Foundation v. GAC Chemical
- Filed February 11, 2002 in US District Court, District of Maine
- Civil Docket No. 00-CV02-24-B-5
- Alleged violations of:
- NPDES Permit terms
- Multi-Sector General Permits
- Clean Water Act
- Settlement reached without finding of violation (common regulatory capture pattern)
-
2021: EPA Region 1 Consent Agreement
- September 29, 2021
- Clean Air Act violations
- 2 counts: General Duty Clause violations (Section 112(r)(1))
- 5 counts: Risk Management Plan regulation violations (Section 112(r)(7))
- Related to handling: anhydrous ammonia, sulfuric acid, other chemicals
- Administrative penalty imposed
Pattern of Regulatory Failure
1998: State Agencies Refuse to Sample
- Ron Huber told to conduct "preliminary, non-scientific samples"
- State would only act if citizen samples showed contamination
- Backwards regulatory approach—burden placed on citizens
- Lack of staff/money cited as excuse
Evidence Tampering:
- GAC cleaned up saltwater intake house before state visit
- Ron Huber's video showed before/after conditions
- State saw sanitized version
Piecemeal Responses:
- No comprehensive site assessment despite decades of problems
- Riprap added sporadically, continues to fail
- Individual spills addressed in isolation
- No cumulative impact analysis
V. 2025 PROFESSIONAL ASSESSMENT: CURRENT CONDITIONS
Home Place Team Assessment (Commissioned by Ron Huber)
Project Details:
- Conducted: April & May 2025
- Team: Paul Bernacki (Living Shoreline Specialist), Ruby Treyball (Project Manager), Jillian Howell (Environmental Management)
- Funded by: Ron Huber, "longtime advocate for Penobscot Bay"
- Scope: 2,050 linear feet of shoreline (½ mile)
- Access: Limited to intertidal zone below Highest Astronomical Tide line (HAT)
Site Conditions Found:
Physical Instability:
- Sections 1-8, 10-18: Highly unstable bluffs (per Maine Geological Survey classification)
- Visible bluff erosion, toe erosion, slumping throughout
- 4 sections of armored shoreline (riprap):
- 1 recent structure: appears stable but shows significant plastic liner exposure
- 3 older structures: overtopped by waves, indicators of downward movement and collapse
- 2 structures primarily concrete pilings
- Ineffective riprap—continuing to fail
- Severe bluff erosion beneath railroad tracks transporting industrial chemicals
Contamination Evidence:
Three Categories of Sediment Contamination:
- Pink-colored sediment/fill layer (visible in bluff)
- Reddish layer on intertidal sediments and rocks near old discharge pipe (western side)
- Grey, powdery substance at multiple locations (Sections 4-6)
Industrial Debris Throughout Intertidal Zone:
- Concrete fragments
- Several hundred feet of inactive pipeline (Sections 10-14)
- Rebar
- Bricks
- Discarded wood
- Plastic materials
- Demolished facility components
- Abandoned building
- Sections 12-14: Industrial debris fills foundational layer of bluff, topped with soil/vegetation that has become unstable, washing ~50 feet into Stockton Harbor
Sampling Results (May 16, 2025):
10 Sediment Samples analyzed for:
- Total aluminum
- Total mercury
- Total sulfur
- pH
- Volatile Organic Compounds (9 samples)
2 Water Samples (from culvert, Section 16):
- Total aluminum
- Total mercury
- Total sulfur
- pH
- VOCs
4 Building Materials Samples:
- PCBs detected
- Lead detected
- Asbestos detected
Key Finding: "Ongoing releases of industrial contamination into Penobscot Bay and intertidal sediment from highly acidic fill containing sulfur and aluminum, and building materials containing lead, asbestos, and PCBs."
Drainage Concerns:
- Industrial railroad infrastructure adjacent to HAT line with severe bluff erosion beneath tracks
- Freshwater wetland on upland with no apparent culverts
- Section 9: sloped upland runoff with distinct channels from rain events
- One active outfall pipe (Section 16)
Overall Assessment: "½ mile of shore and coastal resource is highly unstable bluffs with industrial contamination subject to erosion from the upland into Stockton Harbor. Visually, the adjacent coast and adjacent resource is polluted, and biologically compromised due to exposed industrial waste, and hydrological migration of upland contaminants."
VI. RON HUBER'S CITIZEN ADVOCACY TIMELINE (1998-2025)
26+ Years of Persistent Documentation
1998: Early Documentation
- May 22, 1998: Organized sampling expedition
- Vessel: Island Institute's Raven (Ken Lantz, skipper)
- Crew: Herb Hoche (Penobscot Bay Marine Volunteers), Paul Schroeder (UMaine observer)
- Mission: Sample seafloor near offshore chemical import platform
- Method: Improvised—canister bound to anchor with wire/duct tape, dragged across bottom
- Purpose: Force state action after agencies refused to sample due to "lack of staff and money"
- Created video documentation showing:
- Cache basin overflows
- Toxic landfill soils eroding into bay
- Saltwater intake building conditions
- Before/after of GAC cleanup (evidence of sanitization before state visit)
- Historical maps showing century of industrial use
- Paul Schroeder's observation: Video showed pollution "much more dramatic" than portrayed in Bangor Daily News
Late 1990s: Quonset Hut Documentation
- Photographed deteriorating world's-first industrial laminated wood Quonset hut
- Documented structural arches still sound but roof collapsing
- Observed tarpaper and materials sinking into intertidal flats
- Preserved visual evidence of building material contamination pathway
2015: Formal Restoration Proposal
- Led Friends of Penobscot Bay organization
- Drafted "Penobscot Bay Intertidal Habitat Restoration Plan"
- Purpose: "Survey and remove contaminated mud and debris from approximately one acre of an intertidal flat of Stockton Harbor"
- Referenced 1998 Maine DMR study (state knew about problem for 17 years)
- Documented GAC response:
- Agreed to recontour eroding bluff
- Began removing ceramic wastes from different defunct operation
- But no comprehensive remediation of bauxite tailings or tarpaper
- Proposed actions:
- Core sampling throughout intertidal area
- Aerial mapping to demarcate contaminated areas
- Remove contaminated sediments via intertidal dredge
- Probe for and remove buried roofing materials
- Transport to appropriate landfill
2024-2025: Professional Assessment Commissioned
- Used inherited money to fund comprehensive professional evaluation
- Home Place Team conducted April/May 2025 assessment
- Secured laboratory analysis of samples
- Documented current conditions with drone footage, photography
- Goal: Provide irrefutable evidence forcing comprehensive state action
Organizational Philosophy
As described to Paul Schroeder in 1998:
- Focus on "determining conditions on the ground" vs. just holding meetings
- Independence from corporate funders with potential conflicts of interest
- Direct action and documentation
- Distinction from environmental groups with "ambiguous financial relations with funders who in some cases are the corporations who are involved in potentially questionable siting or polluting issues"
VII. ESTUARINE SIGNIFICANCE & ECOLOGICAL CONCERNS
Stockton Harbor's Critical Role in Penobscot River/Bay System
Hydrodynamic Complexity:
Stockton Harbor sits at the interface of:
- Upstream: Penobscot River freshwater discharge
- Downstream: Penobscot Bay/Maine Coastal Current saltwater influence
- Mobile freshwater/saltwater wedge that moves upriver/downriver with:
- Tidal cycles (moon's gravitational pull)
- Seasonal precipitation variations
- Storm events
- Brackish zone that expands and contracts dynamically
Impact of Sears Island Causeway (Built 1940s):
- Solid fill construction blocked water exchange between Stockton Harbor and Searsport Harbor's Long Cove
- Reduced water circulation to primarily tidal influence
- Created semi-enclosed embayment west of Sears Island
- Limited fetch: less than 1.5 miles from south-southeast and southwest
- Reduced flushing capacity—contaminants more likely to accumulate
Contamination at Critical Interface:
The GAC facility (Kidder Point) is located precisely at the most dynamic part of the estuary:
- Where freshwater meets saltwater
- Where the wedge interface shifts with tides
- Where brackish conditions support unique ecological niches
- Where fish and invertebrates rely on specific salinity gradients
Ecological Consequences:
-
Habitat Degradation:
- 1998 study: "far lower" benthic invertebrate abundance near facility
- 2015 observation: contaminated sediments prevent clams from reaching maturity depth
- Loss of intertidal productivity
-
Bioaccumulation Potential:
- Heavy metals (aluminum, mercury, lead)
- Sulfur compounds
- PCBs in food web
- Asbestos fibers in sediment
-
Brackish Zone Function Compromised:
- Nursery habitat for juvenile fish impacted
- Shellfish beds contaminated
- Water quality degradation affects entire harbor
-
Upstream/Downstream Impacts:
- Contaminants may be transported upriver during high tides
- May be carried into Penobscot Bay during ebb tides
- Affects larger estuarine system beyond immediate area
Climate Change Exacerbation:
- Sea level rise increasing erosion rates
- January 2024 storms demonstrated vulnerability
- Maine experiencing twice the rate of sea level rise compared to century ago
- Increased storm intensity will accelerate contaminant release
- 40% of Maine coast is erodible bluffs—this site is worst-case scenario
VIII. RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS
Immediate Actions Needed
1. Comprehensive Site Assessment by Maine DEP:
- Soil borings in upland area
- Extensive soil testing in bluff and intertidal zone
- Comprehensive water quality testing (multiple sampling events)
- DMR shellfish tissue sampling for contaminants
- Marine geologist site inspection
- Public health/exposure assessment
- Installation of warning signage
2. Emergency Erosion Control:
- Stabilize areas near railroad tracks (chemical transport infrastructure at risk)
- Address sections 12-14 where industrial debris is actively washing into harbor
- Contain freshwater drainage from upland
3. Debris Removal:
- Complete removal of loose industrial debris from intertidal zone
- Remove abandoned pipelines
- Remove collapsing structural supports
- Clear accessible contaminated soils from shoreland zone (75 feet inland from HAT)
Long-term Remediation Strategy
Nature-Based Solutions (Living Shoreline Stabilization):
Maine Geological Survey classifies majority of site as "highly suitable" to "moderately suitable" for Living Shoreline methods.
Recommended Approach:
-
Contaminated Material Removal/Capping:
- Remove contaminated soils where safe and feasible
- Cap remaining materials in place with clean fill
- Prevent further erosion and material release
-
Beach and Bluff Reconstruction:
- Regrade to establish stable profile
- Create fringe marsh at base
- Vegetated bluff above
- Forested upland buffer
-
Toe Structure:
- Cobbles, boulders, coir-encased gravel mimicking glacial deposits
- Absorb storm wave energy
- Vegetate with native fringe shrubs and salt-tolerant grasses
-
Bluff Stabilization:
- Soil deposited in natural stratification pattern
- Stabilized with coir fabric
- Planted with diverse native bluff and upland vegetation
-
Buffer Zone:
- Minimum 10-foot planted buffer above riprap
- Native species
- Supplemental stabilization strategies
-
Phytoremediation:
- EPA-recommended for industrial waste sites
- Vegetated caps
- Buffer strips
- Riparian corridors
- Contaminant containment, removal, destruction methods
-
Adaptive Design:
- Accommodate 6 feet of sea level rise over next 100 years
- Allow system to migrate landward naturally
- Prevent re-exposure of remediated materials
Monitoring and Accountability
Ongoing Requirements:
- Regular water quality monitoring
- Sediment sampling program
- Erosion monitoring
- Shellfish bed testing
- Benthic invertebrate population surveys
- Public reporting of results
Responsible Parties:
- GAC Chemical Corporation (primary responsibility)
- Maine DEP (enforcement and oversight)
- EPA Region 1 (federal oversight)
- Army Corps of Engineers (wetlands jurisdiction)
Financial Responsibility:
- GAC/ESOP should bear remediation costs
- If GAC unable/unwilling, site should be considered for Superfund listing
- State environmental funds as backup
- Penalties from past violations should fund remediation
IX. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
This Site as Case Study
What Stockton Harbor Reveals About Industrial Legacy Pollution:
- Multi-generational contamination accumulation (1944-2025: 81 years)
- Corporate succession shields liability (5 different owners, each claiming limited responsibility)
- Regulatory capture (agencies underfunded, reactive rather than proactive)
- Citizen science necessity (26 years of advocacy required to generate action)
- Climate change as threat multiplier (erosion accelerating contaminant release)
- Estuarine vulnerability (dynamic systems concentrate and spread contamination)
The Citizen vs. The Corporation
David vs. Goliath Pattern:
- Individual with head injury and memory challenges
- Using inherited money for professional assessment
- 26+ years of persistent documentation
- Facing corporate entity with legal/financial resources
- Dealing with underfunded regulatory agencies
- Media downplaying severity of contamination
Yet Ron Huber Has:
- Created comprehensive photographic/video evidence
- Organized scientific sampling expeditions
- Written detailed restoration proposals
- Commissioned professional assessments
- Built coalitions (Friends of Penobscot Bay, Coastal Waters Project, Penobscot Bay Marine Volunteers)
- Maintained meticulous documentation across decades despite memory challenges
This demonstrates:
- Power of persistent citizen advocacy
- Importance of documentation
- Value of scientific approach
- Need for citizen science when agencies fail
- Potential for meaningful change through individual action
X. CONCLUSION: THE PATH FORWARD
Current Status (November 2024)
What We Know:
- 80+ years of industrial chemical manufacturing at sensitive estuarine interface
- Multiple, ongoing contamination pathways into Stockton Harbor
- Documented presence of aluminum, mercury, sulfur, lead, asbestos, PCBs
- Highly unstable bluffs actively eroding contaminated material into bay
- Failing riprap unable to contain pollution
- Climate change accelerating release of legacy contamination
- Benthic invertebrate populations suppressed
- Shellfish habitat compromised
- 77+ documented spills
- Chronic permit violations
- 26+ years of regulatory failure despite citizen documentation
What We Need:
- Comprehensive professional site assessment (soil, water, sediment, biota)
- Full delineation of contamination extent
- Binding remediation plan with enforceable timeline
- Financial assurance for remediation completion
- Nature-based solutions incorporating climate resilience
- Long-term monitoring program
- Public access to all data
- Accountability for past violations
What's at Stake:
- Health of Penobscot Bay fisheries
- Integrity of Penobscot River/Bay estuarine interface
- Shellfish resources
- Marine biodiversity
- Public health (especially for those accessing shoreline)
- Climate resilience of Maine coast
- Environmental justice (GAC employees now own contaminated site)
The Underwater ROV Mission
Ron Huber's planned use of tethered marine robot to explore the offshore pier/pipeline platform represents the next phase of citizen documentation:
- Visual evidence of pipeline condition
- Seafloor contamination mapping
- Abandoned infrastructure assessment
- Additional sampling location identification
This continues the pattern: citizens doing the work regulatory agencies should be doing.
Final Observation
Stockton Harbor embodies the challenge facing estuaries worldwide:
- Legacy industrial contamination
- Climate change acceleration
- Regulatory inadequacy
- Corporate liability diffusion
- Citizen advocacy necessity
The question is not whether contamination exists—the evidence is overwhelming. The question is whether Maine's regulatory agencies will finally act comprehensively, or whether GAC Chemical Corporation will continue to pollute Penobscot Bay while regulatory agencies look the other way.
Ron Huber has done his part for 26+ years. The state of Maine must now do its part.
APPENDIX: KEY DOCUMENTS REFERENCED
- 1950 Bangor Daily News Article - Summers Fertilizer expansion announcement
- 1965 Grace Brothers Appendix 3 - Northern Chemicals plant descriptions for Superfund case
- 1965 Najjab Study - NH3 capacity documentation (45,000 tons/year)
- 1974 Fernview Collision Court Case - Acid fog incident legal findings
- 1998 Maine DMR Study - First state documentation of bauxite contamination (referenced in 2015 plan)
- 1998 Paul Schroeder Field Notes - Sampling expedition documentation
- Aerial Photo Analysis (1939-1990) - Visual evidence of bauxite mud expansion
- 2015 Friends of Penobscot Bay Restoration Plan - Ron Huber's formal remediation proposal
- 2025 Home Place Team Assessment - Professional evaluation commissioned by Ron Huber
- GAC Company History - Corporate succession timeline from company website
Document prepared by: Claude (Anthropic AI Assistant)
At request of: Ron Huber, Belfast, Maine
Date: November 10, 2024
Purpose: Comprehensive synthesis for report preparation and regulatory agency submission
Note: This summary synthesizes information provided by Ron Huber from his personal archives, historical documents, legal cases, and the 2025 professional assessment. All factual claims are sourced from these provided documents. This summary is intended to support Ron Huber's ongoing advocacy efforts and provide a foundation for formal reports to Maine DEP and other regulatory agencies.
